De Vries (2007) then argues that this divide in public opinion about Europe can be awakened by political parties. Following the politicisation of this issue by the main political actors, we would, therefore, expect the second-order nature of the European elections to be challenged at the individual level. In other words, it should cause attitudes towards the EU to matter more in terms of vote choice than in the past and than other factors that usually shape voting patterns in Portugal (ideology, economic perceptions, etc.) . Is the second-order election model losing ground due to the waking of the 'sleeping giant', or is it still useful for understanding Portuguese electoral behaviour in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament?
The aim of this article is to understand whether the economic crisis and the associated austerity policies behind the rise of Euroscepticism in recent years resulted in a decline in the second-order nature of the European election in Portugal. This is accomplished in four steps. First, after summarising the literature on Portuguese electoral behaviour in European elections, we analyse whether the economic crisis had an impact on attitudes towards the EU, particularly in terms of the assessment of EU membership, attitudes towards European unification and trust in European institutions. Second, we focus on the central themes of the campaign and the patterns of political competition, in order to assess the levels of polarisation around the European issue -a condition sine qua non for attitudes towards the EU to matter in terms of voting behaviour. Third, we test the validity of the SOE model at the aggregate level by dissecting the official results of the 2014 European election in Portugal from a longitudinal perspective. Fourth, we check the validity of the SOE model at the micro level by computing a multinomial logistic regression aimed at assessing the relative impact of attitudes towards Europe vis-à-vis other determinants of vote choice (namely left -right self-placement and economic perceptions) in the choices made by Portuguese citizens at the 2014 European election, using similar data for 2009 and 2004 as points of comparison.
The European Elections in Portugal
Portugal joined the European Economic Community and held elections to the European Parliament almost ten years after the first direct European elections. The second-order nature of these elections was evident almost from the outset in the Portuguese case. Turnout has been lower in European elections (equal to or lower than 40 per cent, if we exclude the 1987 and 1989 elections) than in legislative elections (around 60-70 per cent between 1991 and 2011).
2 Also, Portuguese turnout rates in European elections have always been well below the EU average (Lobo 2011) , which means that, from the viewpoint of abstention, in Portugal these elections are more second-order than in other member states.
In Portugal, small parties tend to get better results in European elections than in the previous legislative elections (Freire 2012; Lobo 2011 Lobo ), although in 1999 Lobo and 2004 the scale of the differences was smaller than in other election years. Parties such as the conservative CDS-Partido Popular (CDS-People's Party, CDS-PP), the leftSouth European Society and Politics 383 libertarian Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc, BE) or the Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party, PCP) and Partido Ecologista 'Os Verdes' (Green Party, PEV) coalition Coligac ão Democrática Unitária (Unitary Democratic Coalition, CDU) usually obtain larger vote shares in European elections than in the preceding national elections, while the larger PSD and PS are often punished (or at least less well supported), especially if they are in government at the time. Indeed, incumbents tend to lose a considerable share of votes in European elections compared with their share in national elections. This is especially so when the European elections take place in the middle of the domestic election cycle (Freire & Teperoglou 2007; Freire 2012) , although incumbents are also affected at other periods (Lobo 2011 ; Table A4 , online Appendix). These losses seem to be associated with a decline in their popularity and the deterioration of economic conditions (Freire & Teperoglou 2007; Freire 2012) .
In terms of campaign focus, it can again be said that European elections have been second-order. For instance, in 2009 the campaign materials of the Portuguese parties were characterised by an EU-shaped hole (Jalali & Silva 2011) : there was an absence of European issues. The presence of European issues in Euro-manifestos varies significantly between parties and member states and depends on such factors as the degree of politicisation of Europe at the national level or the level of intra-party disagreement on European issues (Spoon 2012) . In the case of Portugal, the presence of European issues is enough to signal cleavages between opposition and incumbent parties, between those which are ideologically moderate and extreme or between leftwing and right-wing parties (Rodrigues Sanches & Santana-Pereira 2010; SantanaPereira & Sanches 2014) . Nevertheless, the differences found in Euro-manifestos, which few people read, are seldom translated into the mainstream campaign messages of the main parties. Comparatively speaking, low levels of party polarisation on European issues in the Portuguese political system are an important feature of European election campaigns in particular, and of political discussion at the domestic level in general (Freire, Costa Lobo & Magalhães 2009; Lobo 2011; Costa Lobo & Magalhães 2011; Freire 2012) .
The micro-foundations of the second-order election model are poorly studied in the Portuguese case. To the best of our knowledge, no study focusing on Portugal has ever tested the individual-level assumptions of this model.
In sum, European elections have so far been truly second-order in Portugal. The less pronounced second-order nature of some elections (e.g. 1987, 1999) was due mainly to short-term factors, such as the timing of the European elections in the national electoral cycle (Freire & Teperoglou 2007; Lobo 2011) . National issues take over in the campaign materials, while people are disinterested in the campaign and less likely to vote than in national elections; when they do turn out to vote, they tend to punish the incumbent and reward smaller parties. However, no European election had hitherto been conducted in such a climate of economic turmoil and political crisis as the 2014 European election. What were the electoral consequences of holding European elections while a Troika composed of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC) was involved in the country's economic policy? In the pages that follow we will seek to provide an answer to this question.
Attitudes towards the EU before the 2014 European Election
Up until the early years of the twenty-first century, Portuguese public opinion was overwhelmingly positive towards the EU. While levels of Euro-enthusiasm fell slightly during the last decade, the Portuguese have nevertheless remained more enthusiastic about the European project than the EU average (Lobo 2011) . This enthusiasm stands out against the low levels both of turnout in European elections and of interest in the European election campaign reported by the Portuguese between 1989 and 2009 (Lobo 2011) . In other words, ordinary citizens will say they are fond of the idea of Europe and the benefits it has brought to the country, but they are not so willing to pay much attention to a campaign that supposedly focuses on European issues or go to the polling booth to cast a vote in the European elections.
Recent research has revealed an erosion in support for the EU in Portugal and across Southern Europe since 2008. investigated the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis for support for the EU in the countries on the Southern European periphery (Greece, Portugal and Spain), and concluded that the financial crisis has had a profound impact on the level of trust EU citizens grant the EU; however, this effect was not immediate. Similar observations can be made with respect to the perception of the benefits associated with EU membership, as well as support for the economic and monetary union (EMU). As a result, support for the EU in Greece, Portugal and Spain fell from above the EU average to a position close to it. Freire, Teperoglou and Moury (2014) reached similar conclusions in a comparison between Greece and Portugal from 2008 to 2013. The bailout, the austerity packages and the solutions for the debt crisis have all clearly eroded support for the EU.
An analysis of the 2014 European Election Study survey data ) offers empirical support for the hypotheses of reduced support for the EU and the existence of a link between the economic crisis and the attitudes of Portuguese citizens towards Europe. First, around 64 per cent of respondents say they do not trust the European institutions, only 42 per cent considering Portugal's membership of the EU to be a good thing. Second, a regression analysis shows that these attitudes are explained by assessments of the national status quo. Controlling for age, gender, religiosity, education, trade union membership, subjective social class and ideology (left -right self-placement), we observe that citizens who have a more positive evaluation of the country's economic situation (sociotropic retrospective economic perception: that is, focused on economic developments over the last 12 months) and who approve of the government's record (a proxy for support for the austerity measures implemented) trust the EU institutions more. Approval of the government's performance is also a predictor of attitudes towards Portugal's membership, while economic perceptions affect attitudes towards European unification, which are less South European Society and Politics 385 positive among those who have a negative view of the economy (Table A2 in the online Appendix).
Both the conclusions derived from recent studies Freire, Teperoglou & Moury 2014) and our own data analysis reveal that the crisis and its aftermath (i.e. austerity policies), for which a large proportion of Southern European citizens blame the EU (see , have had an impact in terms of attitudes towards the EU, and thus have the potential to awaken the so-called 'sleeping giant' -at least at the mass level (Van der Eijk & Franklin 2007) .
The next step in our analysis is to discover whether the crisis and its aftermath have had significant consequences in terms of party polarisation on EU-related issues. The role of parties in politicising European issues, namely by taking clear and differentiated stances on them, is crucial for the translation of attitudes towards the EU into different patterns of party choice (De Vries 2007; Freire, Costa Lobo & Magalhães 2009; Costa Lobo & Magalhães 2011) . With that goal in mind, we analyse the 2014 European election campaign and assess the level of the politicisation of European issues in the next section.
The 2014 European Election Campaign
The 2014 European election in Portugal took place on Sunday 25 May. In addition to those parties with representation in the national and European parliaments (the incumbents PSD and CDS-PP, which stood in coalition as the Portugal Alliance or Alianc a Portugal, 3 PS, BE and CDU), a further 12 parties took part in this election. Most of these were micro parties that stood no chance of receiving more than one per cent of the vote; however, three of them deserve special attention. Two new parties emerged out of the internal divisions in BE: Livre (Free), a green and left-libertarian party led by Rui Tavares, a member of the European Parliament (MEP) elected on the BE list in 2009, and Movimento Alternativa Socialista (Alternative Socialist Movement, MAS), led by Gil Garcia. Both parties were running in an election for the first time, and their ability to take advantage of the crisis within the BE was to be tested on 25 May. The Movimento Partido da Terra (Earth Party; MPT), a conservative ecologist party with a record of poor performance in European and legislative elections, also deserves special attention. This party adopted a strong antiestablishment discourse and chose Marinho Pinto, a well-known lawyer who has appeared often on Portuguese daytime TV shows and has served as leader of the Portuguese bar association, to be its leading candidate.
While the official campaign did not begin until two weeks before polling day, discussions about the European election and other Europe-related issues had started several months before. One of the most important issues discussed in the public arena during the months leading up to the election was the end of the adjustment programme that had been implemented as part of the bailout agreement. The need for a bailout had been created in March 2011, when José Só crates, leader of the PS and prime minister since 2005, was not able to pass a package of austerity measures in the Portuguese parliament. Só crates resigned and new elections took place in June 2011, just a few weeks after the three parties with previous governmental experience (PS, PSD and CDS -PP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the three foreign institutions known as Troika (the IMF, the EC and the ECB), leading to a e78 billion bailout. Those elections were won by the PSD, which formed a post-election coalition with CDS-PP to guarantee a majority of seats in parliament. The bailout programme would be finished by 4 May 2014, immediately before the start of the European election campaign. During the campaign for the European Parliament election, the discussion centred on two main axes: whether the exit from the programme would be 'clean', i.e. without the need for additional aid, and which of the two main parties -PS and PSD -was to be blamed for the (original and current) economic crisis, the external intervention and the austerity measures that followed (Lisi 2014; Magalhães 2012b; . In the end, a second bailout was not necessary.
While being blamed by the smaller left-wing parties, the PS and PSD exchanged accusations. The PS sought to use the election as a referendum on the government, which it blamed for having caused a worsening of the economic and social situation with its neoliberal orthodoxy and for going much further than the Troika's demands on both deregulation and austerity measures. In turn, the PSD stressed the successful exit from the external intervention and the current government's success in avoiding a second bailout, while emphasising the PS's disastrous management of the crisis until 2011, and portraying this party as having been solely responsible for the external intervention (Lisi 2014) .
A preliminary analysis of the Euro-manifestos prepared by the four political groupings with representation in the European Parliament, based on five key dimensions regarding the EU and the economic crisis, showed that, generally speaking, parties decided not to substantially change their discourse in 2014 vis-à-vis past European elections (Fernandes & Santana-Pereira 2014) . As expected, the interaction between party ideology, size and status (government versus opposition) explained the main differences in terms of discourse on Europe observed between the centre-right incumbent parties and the small left-wing parties in the opposition.
Also in tune with the authors' expectations, Alianc a Portugal, the government incumbents, was clearly pro-EU, expressing favourable positions about the EU and defending Portugal's permanent place in the Eurozone. They also supported the mutualisation of the debt by issuing Eurobonds, but only when and if European consensus on the topic emerged. In turn, the PS toned down its blatant enthusiasm due to its current role as the main opposition party, but remained nevertheless proEuropean. This party called for the issuing of Eurobonds (for national public debts above 60 per cent of gross domestic product [GDP] , the Maastricht ceiling), for a more pro-growth Europe and for the Europeanisation of social measures, such as unemployment benefits, in EU countries in which the rate of unemployment is above the European average (Fernandes & Santana-Pereira 2014) . The difficulty the PS had in differentiating itself from the right-wing coalition was because its proposals were very dependent on a European consensus and restrictions in the Fiscal Compact Treaty South European Society and Politics 387 will be binding on whoever forms the next government. Signed in 2012, this treaty entered into force in 2013-14 in 25 EU member-states, and commits the signatories to stricter fiscal discipline by strengthening budget deficit and debt rules.
Finally, further to the left, the CDU was clearly Eurosceptic while the BE sent out mixed signals by expressing support for the EU (as an ideal) while also strongly criticising its current economic and social policy. The smaller radical-left parties focused on European issues more often than the PS (Lisi 2014) ; however, their positions were rather varied, which contributed to a deeper fragmentation of the left. CDU, the new party MAS and the fringe Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (Portuguese Workers' Communist Party -Reorganised Movement of the Party of the Proletariat; PCTP-MRPP) defended clearly anti-EU positions, including withdrawal from the Eurozone and renegotiation of the sovereign debt, and rejected measures such as the issuing of Eurobonds. The BE and Livre, on the other hand, held more moderate positions on these issues (Fernandes & Santana-Pereira 2014) .
The MPT's position on European issues was deliberately vague (Lisi 2014) , focusing more on anti-establishment statements and the regeneration of the political class, in the same vein as Matteo Renzi's rottamazione (radical renewal) campaign in 2010 -12 or the ideas advanced by the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S) on the Italian traditional political elite.
The first polls on voting intentions in the European election were published by the media in January 2014, before the candidates and party manifestos of the main political parties had been presented. The Aximage polls published in Correio da Manhã and Jornal de Negócios predicted that the incumbent parties (PSD and CDS-PP) and the main opposition party PS would obtain roughly similar results, with a slight advantage for the former. Two weeks later, in a poll conducted by Pitagó rica and published in the newspaper i, the incumbent parties had a four per cent lead over the PS, which was confirmed in a poll published in the same newspaper in early March ( Figure A1 and Table A3 , online Appendix). Considering the government's unpopularity (Freire 2014 ) and the customary punishment of incumbent parties in second-order elections (Reif & Schmitt 1980) , these patterns may reflect a certain disappointment with or lack of confidence in the PS and its leader as true and reliable alternatives. It was only from late March onwards that support for the PS began to rise in the polls ( Figure A1 , online Appendix).
Most polling companies predicted a truly disastrous result for BE. The party's expected vote share would be half the figure obtained in 2009, and similar to the catastrophic result obtained in the 2011 parliamentary election. This was thought to be due to the crisis within the party since the departure of its former leader, Francisco Louc ã, and the threat posed by Livre. Interestingly, it was not until May that the polling agencies decided to detach MPT from the other small parties in their reports, since it was only then that the data began to suggest that this party would probably receive a larger number of votes than it did in 2009 ( Figure A1 and Table A3 , online Appendix).
In sum, the 2014 campaign was characterised by a discussion of Europe-related issues, but mainly in terms of the intervention of European institutions in the financial and economic management of the country and the role of the EU in finding solutions for the sovereign debt crisis. Most political parties did not adopt different stances towards Europe compared with previous European elections: the incumbents were vocal in their support for Europe, the main opposition party toned down its enthusiasm for Europe without, however, becoming sceptical towards it, while the communists maintained their traditional anti-EU stance. The other parties, such as BE, Livre and MPT, adopted mixed stances or remained deliberately vague on Europe.
The Results
In Table 1 Table A4 , online Appendix). This is clearly in line with the prediction of Reif & Schmitt (1980) model. The PS was attributed a narrow victory in these elections, with 31.5 per cent of votes against the 27.7 per cent obtained by Alianc a Portugal (Portugal Alliance, the electoral coalition of the PSD and CDS-PP) (Table 1) . Thus, the strong discontent with the incumbent government did not translate into a substantial victory for the centre-left opposition.
Looking at these results, one could argue that although Alianc a Portugal only narrowly lost to the PS the fact is that this two-party coalition came second to a single party and lost a massive share of its vote (22.7 percent points compared with the 2011 legislative and 12.4 percent points compared with the 2009 European election). Why was this not regarded as a significant defeat in Portugal? The answer to this is that, unlike in 2004, its main competitor failed to win a significant electoral victory. The 2004 election had taken place under similar circumstances: the PSD and CDS-PP were the parties of government and stood as a coalition, Forc a Portugal (Go Portugal), in the European elections, which were being held in the middle of the domestic electoral cycle, and austerity policies (although much less severe and implemented without external intervention) were also being enforced. In 2004, the incumbent rightwing parties were severely punished, losing 15.6 per cent of their vote share compared with the 2002 legislative election, while the PS obtained 44.5 per cent of votes and emerged as the clear winner (Table A4 , online Appendix; Freire 2012). In 2014, the PS may not have had the chance to capitalise on the governing coalition's losses due to the legacy of its role as incumbent in times of severe crisis and its decision to sign the memorandum of understanding with the Troika.
The protest against Europe, the government and austerity was channelled mainly through the left-wing CDU, which secured its best result in European elections, and South European Society and Politics 389 the MPT, which performed much better than the opinion polls predicted (Table 1;  Table A3 , online Appendix). 4 The protest voiced by MPT in this election was not only against the sitting government and austerity, but also, perhaps even to a greater extent, towards the political establishment in general. However, not all the small parties were rewarded in 2014: BE had a poor result, losing more than half of its votes compared with 2009, and two-thirds of its seats (Table 1 ). This might suggest that the diffuse protest strategy is not positive for the BE. Also, the results obtained by Livre suggest that at least some BE voters were unhappy with its strategy. Finally, it is worth mentioning that although none of the micro parties performed well enough to elect an MEP, the Partido pelos Animais e pela Natureza (Party of Animals and Nature; PAN) and Livre did relatively well, with vote shares in areas where district magnitude (for the national elections) is very high (Oporto and Lisbon) giving them some hope of electing deputies in the 2015 legislative elections (Table 1) . Turnout has always been fairly low in European elections in Portugal; however, the 2014 turnout was the lowest ever, 33.7 per cent (the second lowest was 35.5 per cent in 1994). Strong discontent with the economic crisis, austerity policies and the current government translated into apathy rather than greater participation. This evidence supports the idea that the 2014 European elections were more second-order than ever in terms of turnout. Moreover, at 7.5 per cent, there were more spoiled and blank papers than ever before (the next highest was 6.6 per cent in 2009). These figures represent discontent also translated into protest: not necessarily against Europe, but at least against the political establishment. Again, the second-order nature of the 2014 European Parliament elections is reinforced by these empirical data.
Finally, a word that can be used to describe the 2014 European election in Portugal is 'fragmentation'. This feature can be measured in terms of the effective number of electoral (ENEP) and parliamentary (ENPP) parties. In 2014, it reached its highest level in European elections (Table 2 ; see also Freire 2012, pp. 194-195) . This shows that vote concentration in the two largest parties is in decline and that people are increasingly voting for the smaller parties. These results can be interpreted as a protest against both the European consensus and the mainstream political establishment. A larger number of candidates (many without seats) and increasing fragmentation are also behind the high level of electoral disproportionality observed in 2014 -the highest in European elections (Table 2) .
In sum, it seems the protest against the mainstream parties, which was already apparent in national elections in Greece and Italy (Bosco & Verney 2012; Verney & Bosco 2013) , showed its true colours in the 2014 European election in Portugal, one year before the legislative election, while both the level of incumbent punishment and Source: Author's calculations from data available in CNE (2009 -14) and DGAI-MAI (2004 -14) . Notes: *Total volatility (TV) ¼ (jPiV j þ jPjVj þ jPkVj þ jPlVj . . . þjPnVj)/2, where PiV represents the change, in absolute terms, in the aggregate vote for a party between two consecutive elections (Bartolini & Mair 1990, p. 20) .
, where P(iV þ jV þ kV) represents the net change, in absolute terms, in the aggregate vote for parties i, j and k -all of which come from the same bloc -between two consecutive elections (Bartolini & Mair, 1990, p. 22) . ‡ Gallagher's (1991) South European Society and Politics 391 the level of party system fragmentation in the 2014 European elections, which reached their highest levels, indicate that the second-order nature of the contest was stronger than ever. The results of the multinomial logistic regression for 2014 are presented in Table 3 . The dependent variable is vote choice in the 2014 European Parliament election: BE, CDU, PS and MPT vis-à-vis the incumbent coalition Alianc a Portugal (PSD and CDS-PP). The independent variables can be grouped into two main categories: key factors of voting behaviour in national elections (left -right self-placement, perceptions of the evolution of the national economy in the previous year, assessment of the government's record) and attitudes towards Europe (assessment of Portugal's EU membership as a good, neutral or bad thing, trust in EU institutions, and attitudes towards European unification). The model also includes socio-demographic variables such as age, gender and education, as well as traditional determinants of vote choice, such as religiosity, social class (subjective self-placement) and trade union membership. Further details on the dependent, independent and control variables are available in Table A1 in the online Appendix.
The model explains more than 70 per cent of the variation in voting behaviour in the 2014 European election (Table 3 ). The most significant predictor is ideology, in the sense that the more right-wing the respondents say they are the less likely they were to vote BE, CDU, PS or MTP instead of casting a vote for the centre-right incumbent coalition. Assessment of the government's record is also an important factor: all else being equal, those who approve of the government's performance are less likely to have voted for the BE, CDU or PS instead of Alianc a Portugal. However, this factor does not distinguish the PSD/CDS-PP and the MPT electorates. Interestingly, economic perceptions do not help explain the different choices made by Portuguese voters in 2014. This could be because economic perceptions may have already been partially and indirectly measured by other factors in the regression model, such as governmental appraisals or ideology (which are moderately correlated with economic perceptions). Also, its effect may be partially mediated by attitudes towards European unification, which, as we have seen, are explained by sociotropic retrospective economic perceptions (Table A2 , online Appendix).
The impact of attitudes towards Europe on vote choices is less perceptible than that of ideology or the assessment of the government's performance (Table 3) . Citizens who believe membership of the EU is a bad thing are more likely to vote Source: Authors' own elaboration of data collected by European Election Studies (EES 2014) see . Notes: Values are unstandardised coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Multicollinearity diagnostics give negative results: no VIFs higher than 1.7. The average discrete changes scores are an average of the changes in the probability of voting for each party caused by shifting from the minimum to the maximum value of the independent variable, when all the other variables are held at their means. These scores vary between 0 (no impact at all) and 1 (full impact), thus higher values mean a stronger mean impact. Figures in bold are statistically significant. ***p , 0.001; **p , 0.01; *p , 0.05.
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CDU than Alianc a Portugal, but this factor does not differentiate between the incumbent's electorate and those who voted BE, PS or MPT. Also, those who think European unification has gone too far are less likely to vote Alianc a Portugal than BE, but again attitudes towards unification do not help explain the decision to vote for the other three parties rather than for the incumbents. Finally, trust in EU institutions was not a significant factor of voting behaviour in the 2014 European election. It is worth noting that these results are in line with known positions and explicit messages advanced by the two mainstream parties in the election campaign. In fact, while the incumbents were clearly pro-EU, the main opposition party, the PS, was not able to distinguish itself from its main opponent on this issue. Consequently, attitudes towards the EU have no impact on decisions to vote PSD/CDS-PP rather than PS.
To rank the set of independent variables according to their contribution to explaining voting behaviour in the 2014 European election, we calculated average discrete changes in predicted probabilities for each factor. This index, presented in the last column of Table 3 , displays the average of the changes in the probability of voting for each party caused by shifting from the minimum to the maximum value of the independent variable when all the other factors are held at their mean values, and varies between 0 (no impact at all) and 1 (full impact). In 2014, ideology is the most powerful predictor of voting behaviour, being closely followed by assessment of the government's record. Attitudes towards European unification come third, ahead of education, age and sociotropic retrospective economic perceptions (which, however, do not display statistically significant effects with a 95 per cent confidence interval). In short, attitudes towards the EU were less important in terms of voting behaviour than ideology or support for the government's performance. These empirical results support the assumption that the 2014 European results were also truly second-order elections from the microlevel viewpoint.
However, the relative impact of attitudes towards Europe (namely towards European unification) was greater in 2014 than in the previous two European elections. In Tables 4 and 5 we present the results of two multinomial logistic regression models testing the same set of independent and control variables used for 2014 in order to explain voting behaviour in 2004 and 2009. In the 2009 European election, ideology (in terms of left-right self-placement) and assessment of the government's record were the main factors in voting choice, being closely followed by age and education (Table 4 ). The impact of ideology was in the expected direction: the more left-wing that citizens describe themselves to be, the less likely they were to vote for the PSD or CDS-PP instead of supporting the incumbent PS, and the more likely they were to vote for the CDU. Also, disapproval of the government's record increased the probability of voting for any main party rather than the incumbent. Attitudes towards Europe do not show statistically significant results with a 95 per cent confidence interval, and the average discrete change indexes for those variables are among the lowest.
In the 2004 European election, the context of which most closely resembles that of the 2014 election (see above), a similar pattern emerges (Table 5) . On the one hand, there are no statistically significant effects of attitudes towards Europe on voter choices; on the other, the average discrete change indexes of these variables are low, especially when compared with the impact of ideology, government's approval, economic perceptions and subjective social class. 
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If in 2004 and 2009 attitudes towards Europe had no statistically significant results and were among the least important factors in the model, in 2014 those attitudes help explain decisions to vote BE or CDU rather than PSD/CDS-PP. Attitudes on unification were the third most important predictor of voter choice, after ideology and assessment of the government's record. In other words, the 2014 European elections were still second-order, but European issues seems to have mattered a bit more than they had in the previous elections, although only for the contrast between the radical left (CDU and BE) and the incumbent right-wing coalition.
Conclusions
The 2014 European election in Portugal took place in a context of increasing anxiety and dissatisfaction with EU and the austerity measures it had implemented in order to combat the economic and debt crises. The economic crisis, the bailout and the external intervention of the Troika between 2011 and 2014 were accompanied by an increase in Euroscepticism. In the minds of both voters and the political elite, those events are connected with the idea that Europe does not care about the well-being of the Portuguese, and that it is at least partially responsible for the crisis and the harsh austerity policies that followed. This means the ideal of European solidarity at times of crisis is perceived as a mirage. Several studies have clearly documented this trend, which has the potential to both awaken the 'sleeping giant' and erode the validity of the SOE model. Our goal here was to assess whether the economic crisis and what followed had consequences in terms of Portuguese voting behaviour in the 2014 European elections: that is, to test whether there were signs of an erosion in the validity of the SOE model at the aggregate and micro levels, and at the supply (party competition) and demand (citizen preferences and behaviour) levels.
The expectations of Reif & Schmitt (1980) model were largely met. Turnout levels were the lowest in the history of European elections in Portugal while the proportion of invalid and blank papers was the highest, which is in line with second-order election theory. Considering the exceptionally difficult conditions facing the Portuguese, we must conclude that, at least in European elections, in Portugal harsh times have generated more apathy than protest. The level of party system fragmentation in the 2014 European elections was very high and corroborates the observation that small parties tended to perform well; indeed, with the exception of the BE, the share of the vote secured by most small parties was considerably higher than that received in the previous legislative election. The incumbent parties were severely punished and the other mainstream party in the Portuguese landscape, the PS, despite having been slightly rewarded by the electorate, was unable to win the votes lost by the governing coalition, as it did in 2004. Finally, at the micro level, attitudes towards Europe matter less in terms of vote choice than do ideology or approval of the government's record.
Our explanation for the resilience of the SOE model, even in times of severe economic crisis, austerity policies and the politicisation of Europe, relies on a mismatch on EU issues between the demand side (growing citizen potential for contestation) and the supply side (low politicisation of EU issues at the party level, especially between major parties). The two major parties in each ideological field (centre-left PS, centre-right PSD) were not significantly different on EU issues and while voter Euroscepticism was growing considerably it still had difficulties gaining South European Society and Politics 397 partisan expression, except through fringe parties on the (radical) left. To put it another way, although Euroscepticism is growing (on the demand side) it could not be completely awakened (in terms of election results) because it could not be easily translated into partisan voting behaviour (except at the margins).
However, the 2014 European elections show minor signs that the 'sleeping giant' is being aroused. First, the fact the main opposition challenger, the PS, did not profit from the incumbent's defeat as much as it had under similar conditions in the past may be linked to its mainly pro-EU stance. The PS, PSD and CDS-PP are not just the mainstream/government parties in the Portuguese landscape; they also represent the forces of European consensus. The success of the CDU and MPT, both of which protested against the national and European status quo, are also a possible sign that the sleeping giant is awake, especially in the case of CDU. Finally, individual-level data show that the impact of EU attitudes, while modest, was nevertheless stronger than in the two previous European elections. These are, nevertheless, small signs in an aggregate context that allow us to portray the 2014 European Parliament election as more second-order than ever before.
